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Establishing Union Liability For
Unauthorized Strikes
INTRODUCTION
In labor intensive industries, labor stability is essential to the
economic success of industry participants. This is particularly so
for those companies which employ unionized labor forces in the
coal industry in light of increasingly competitive domestic and
international coal markets.' Consequently, the wildcat 2 or unau-
thorized strike presents serious problems for both employers of
union workers and the rank and file union membership. Em-
ployers face curtailed productivity and ultimately reduced prof-
itability while the union membership must endure lost wages and
benefits and the prospect of long term unemployment.3
Congress' enactment of Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) 4 authorizes an action by an em-
ployer against a union' for damages resulting from an illegal
C. PERRY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND Ti DECLINE OF THE UNITED MINE
WORKERS 127 (1984).
2 The term "wildcat strike" is defined as a work stoppage, generally spontaneous
in character, by a group of union employees without union authorization or approval.
A wildcat strike may exist where a local union has supported a strike but has not
received the approval of the national or international union. Such action generally is in
violation of the applicable bargaining agreement. H. ROBERTS, ROBERT'S DICTIONARY OF
INDusTRIAL RELATIONS 582 (1971). See also the definition contained in BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1433 (5th ed. 1979): "A strike called without authorization from the union
or in violation of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement." The term
"wildcat strike," as used herein, is meant to be synonymous with an unauthorized strike
or an illegal strike in violation of a bargaining agreement.
' C. PERRY, supra note 1, at 208-09.
4 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA) § 301, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1982).
1 In the coal industry, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) is organized
into local, district, and international unions. The locals have jurisdiction over a single
mine, with districts and subdistricts over them organized on a state, or less-than-state,
basis. Above the districts is the international, with a president, vice-president, secretary-
treasurer, and executive board including delegates from each district. M. FoRKOSCH,
TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 199-200 (2d ed. 1965). For a description of the governmental
structure of the UMWA, see C. PERRY, supra note 1, at 93.
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work stoppage.6 However, "before a local union, or any union,
can be found liable for such damages, the union's responsibility
for the work stoppage must be established according to some
recognized theory of liability." 7
Historically, courts have recognized three theories - the (1)
agency theory, (2) mass action theory, and (3) all reasonable
means theory - to establish union liability for damages caused
by unauthorized work stoppages.8 Courts have typically applied
these theories individually or in combination to serve as a basis
for finding union liability for wildcat strikes. 9
In Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA,1O the United States Supreme
Court specifically addressed the agency and all reasonable means
theories. However, the Supreme Court did not directly address
the mass action theory. Relying on the Supreme Court's silence
in the Carbon Fuel decision with respect to the mass action
theory, both the Seventh' and Tenth 2 Circuit Courts of Appeals
have held the mass action theory invalid as a separate theory of
union liability. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit'3 recently reaf-
firmed the validity of the mass action theory thereby establishing
a conflict between the circuits.
This Comment reviews the historical development and appli-
cation of the three theories to better delineate the true scope of
6 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose
activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the
acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of
the United States ...
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is
acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the que§tion of whether the specific acts performed
were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
I Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1702, 709 F.2d 882, 884 (4th Cir.
1983).
a Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1261, 725 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (10th
Cir. 1984).
9 See Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1702, 709 F.2d 882 (4th Cir.
1983); U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979); Eazor Express, Inc.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
-0 444 U.S. 212 (1979) [hereinafter Carbon Fuel I1].
Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 2216, 779 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985).
2 Local 1261, 725 F.2d 1258.
' Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local Union No. 2322, 826 F.2d 1059 (4th
Cir. 1987) (text in WESTLAW).
[VOL. 5:357
UNION LIABILITY
each theory. Further, an analysis of the current usage of the
theories will determine which theories or parts of them remain
valid after the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel. Finally,
the Comment reviews the Fourth Circuit's recent decision which
validated the mass action theory. The discussion emphasizes the
decision's effect on the theory's future.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIABILITY THEORIES
A. Agency Theory
The agency theory of union liability arises from the notion
that the union entity in some way made itself a party to the
illegal strike.' 4 The Supreme Court first applied the agency the-
ory to union liability in Coronado Coal v. UMWA. 's The case
involved an action for damages against the international union
for property destruction caused by the actions of the local un-
ion.' 6 In considering the international union's liability for the
local's actions, the Supreme Court stated that in order to impose
liability on the international, the plaintiff must clearly show
"that what was done was done by [the international's] agents in
accordance with their fundamental agreement of association.'
' 7
The Court noted that for a corporation to be held responsible
for the wrongs committed by its agents, the plaintiff must first
show that the agent was acting within the scope of the corpor-
ation's business. The Court reasoned that no stricter rule could
be enforced against an unincorporated organization like the in-
ternational union.1
8
More recently, the agency theory has been applied in deter-
mining union liability for strikes by coal miners in violation of
implied no-strike promises in collective bargaining agreements. 19
The implied no-strike promise arises from express arbitration
clauses in National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements. 20
North River Energy Corp. v. UMWA, 664 F.2d 1184, 1192 (l1th Cir. 1981).
268 U.S. 295 (1925).
16 Id. at 299.
' Id. at 304.
is Id.
19 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 519 F.2d 1249, 1250 (5th Cir. 1975).
20 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements are the product of collective bar-
gaining between the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) and the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA). The industry wide agreements represent the basic
1989-90]
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The mere occurrence of a strike does not raise a presumption
rendering the union responsible as an entity separate from its
members. 2' The Fourth Circuit, in United Construction Workers
v. Haislip Baking Co. ,22 held that for the union entity to be held
liable for damages resulting from the illegal strike, a company
must prove that the union's agents, acting within the scope of
their authority, participated in, ratified, or encouraged the con-
tinuation of the strike. 23 Actual authority is not necessary since
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 24 specifically provides
that, in determining whether any person is acting as an agent
for another person, the question of whether the actions were
actually authorized shall not be controlling. 25 Furthermore, the
Fifth Circuit stated in Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steel-
workers of America"6 that an agent's actions bind the union
entity regardless of whether the actions are specifically author-
ized by the entity.
Courts have differed on the degree of evidence sufficient to
establish an agency relationship between an international or dis-
trict union entity and the local union. The Haislip court placed
emphasis on whether the international or district union adopted
or encouraged the strike.2 7 The Sixth Circuit has held that if the
subject matter of the strike's underlying grievance was one in
which the district or international had a strong interest, inaction
by those entities in ending the strike might imply endorsement
by the union. 28 The Fifth Circuit has further held that where the
plaintiff shows that the district or international exercises all-
pervasive control over the local, the acts of the local may be
operating contract between the BCOA and the UMWA, addressing such issues as wages
and benefits, manpower utilization, and working conditions. C. PERRY, supra note 1,
at 57-64, 73-91.
21 U.S. Steel Corp., 519 F.2d at 1253.
- 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
23 Id. at 876-77.
- LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
25 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is
acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed
were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
430 F.2d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 1970).
27 Haislip, 223 F.2d at 877-78.
See Riverton Coal Co. v. UMWA, 453 F.2d 1035, 1042 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 915 (1972).
[VOL. 5:357
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imputed to the parent entity.2 9 Before adopting this rule, the
Fifth Circuit implied in an earlier decision that evidence of past
strikes is relevant to the liability question in that "[a] series of
strikes which arguably amount to a pattern of activity at the
local and district levels .. .may give rise to, or at least support
an inference of union 'instigation, support, ratification, or con-
donation.' "30
The difficulty of determining an agency relationship between
the international or district and the local depends on the partic-
ular circumstances of each case. The presence of a relationship
obviously exists where the international, through its agents, af-
firmatively induced and encouraged its members to refuse to
work. a" In other cases, international union involvement has been
less evident.3 2 In evaluating union liability, modern courts go
well beyond the mere claims of the employer and the denials of
the union as evidenced by the rise in prominence of the three
liability theories. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Coronado
CoaP3 relied almost exclusively on the denials of the international
union president.3 4 The court held the international was not liable
for the local's actions although evidence indicated the interna-
tional's involvement with formulating the plan carried out by
the local union members. 5
After the Coronado Coal decision, problems of proving un-
ion liability under common law agency principles became appar-
ent. Specifically, union entities could escape liability merely by
asserting that the illegal strikes resulted from each striker's in-
dividual decision to participate. Consequently, a union entity
generally incurred no liability unless a convention of the entity's
membership or its officers, acting at the direction of the mem-
29 U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 1979).
o U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 519 F.2d at 1256 (quoting Central Appalachian
Coal Co. v. UMWA, 376 F.Supp. 914, 923 (S.D. W.Va. 1974)).
11 Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 430 F.2d 446, 457
(5th Cir. 1970).
32 E.g., North River Energy Corp. v. UMWA, 664 F.2d at 1193-94 (only evidence
presented that union agents were acting within scope of their authority as union repre-
sentatives was the fact they failed to report to work); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Inter-
national Union, UMWA, 500 F.Supp. 72, 75 (D. Utah, C.D. 1980) (fact that all union
officials failed to work their shift cannot be construed as union ratification of the strike
since officials were subject to threats and intimidation), aff'd on other grounds, 725
F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1984).
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bership, authorized the act.3 6 This weakness in the agency theory
led to the birth, in 1948, of the mass action theory of liability.
7
B. Mass Action Theory
The weakness in the agency theory came to light during a
nationwide strike involving between 350,000 and 450,000 mem-
bers of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA).38 At
the time, the UMWA was engaged in a bitter dispute with the
signatories of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 194739 concerning a provision of the agreement relating to
pension funds. 40 After a board of inquiry had determined that
the miners' strike imperiled the nation's health and safety, Pres-
ident Harry S Truman directed the Attorney General to file a
complaint for injunctive relief against the striking miners. The
district court issued a preliminary restraining order ordering that
the strike cease until a decision on the merits of the controversy
could be rendered. In response to the court order to terminate
the strike, the President of the United Mine Workers Union,
John L. Lewis, declared that miners had left the mines entirely
as a result of their own individual volition and without any
instruction from union officials. Hence, Lewis concluded there
was no organized strike among the miners. 4' This national crisis
engendered the mass action theory of union liability.
In order to refute Lewis' argument that an organized strike
did not exist, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia in United States v. International Union, UMWA reasoned
that men do not act collectively without leadership. Therefore,
the proposition that 350,000 to 450,000 men would all have the
same idea to strike concurrently was ridiculous.4 2 On this basis,
the court held the international union liable for the actions of
the membership, without any hard evidence directly linking the
international to the strike. The consequence of the court's hold-
ing meant that as long as a union collectively functions as a
11 United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 415 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
11 United States v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F.Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C.
1948).
3. Id. at 565.
39 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
40 International Union, 77 F.Supp at 565.
" Id. at 564.
41 Id. at 566.
[VoL. 5:357
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union, it must be held responsible for the mass action of its
members .41
Interestingly, while reviewing correspondence from Lewis to
the union membership, the court found language" which could
be interpreted as code words or signals to the membership se-
cretly intended to cause a strike to occur .4  The court viewed
Lewis' use of this technique to call a strike as a means for the
union to avoid responsibility. Accordingly, the court held that
the union could not escape liability simply by substituting "a
nod, a wink, or a code" in place of the word strike. 46
Over the years, a number of courts have refined and applied
the mass action theory. However, courts have differed as to the
theory's specific applicability to the various levels of union hi-
erarchy. 47 The Third Circuit, in Eazor Express, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters," relied primarily on the all reasonable
means test 49 in its analysis of international union liability. How-
ever, the court applied the mass action theory as an alternative
means of holding the international union liable for a strike
conducted by the local union in violation of a no-strike agree-
ment. The court stated that the international could be held liable
on the theory that mass action by union members must realis-
tically be regarded as union action.5 0
However, one year later in U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 5'
the Third Circuit held that liability under the mass action theory
"must be limited to the entity whose membership acts in con-
cert .... Thus absent a showing of complicity on the part of a
larger union entity - the District or International Union, for
example - only the local can be held liable under the mass
action theory."'52 The Fourth53 and Fifth5 4 Circuits later adopted
41 Id. at 566-67.
' C. PEaRY, supra note 1, at 138.
41 International Union, 77 F.Supp. at 566.
'6 Id. at 567.
47 Compare Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1978)[hereinafter
Carbon Fuel 11, aff'd, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) with Eazor Express, Inc. v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975) (cases apply the mass action theory to
different levels of union hierarchy).
" 520 F.2d 951.
49 See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
50 Eazor Express, 520 F.2d at 963.
534 F.2d 1063, 1074 (3d Cir. 1976).
52 U.S. Steel, 534 F.2d at 1074.
53 Carbon Fuel I, 582 F.2d at 1349.
s, U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 1979).
1989-901
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this idea of limiting union liability to the entity whose member-
ship acts in concert.
C. All Reasonable Means Theory
In U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA,55 the Third Circuit stated its
belief that strict union liability should not be based merely upon
the conduct of the membership. Looking beyond the mass action
of the union members to evaluate union liability, the court stated
that "irrespective of the theory upon which union liability for
unauthorized strikes is premised, the court must inquire into the
reasonableness of the attempts by local and parent union offi-
cials to avert or halt wildcat activity by the membership." '5 6 This
proposition represents the theoretical foundation of the all rea-
sonable means theory of union liability.
In Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
5 7
Eazor Express Inc., a motor freight carrier, contracted to acquire
Daniels Motor Freight, Inc. Employees of both Eazor and Dan-
iels belonged to the Teamsters International Union. Collective
bargaining agreements containing express no-strike clauses gov-
erned the relationship between the employees and the employers.
The pertinent part of the agreements precluded strikes by the
union until exhaustion of all possible means of settlement as
contained in the individual agreements." Before the completion
of the takeover, Daniels' union employees walked off the job
and established picket lines at the Eazor terminal in Pittsburgh. 9
In an action brought by Eazor Express to recover damages
for alleged unauthorized strikes, the Third Circuit agreed with
the defendant international union that the local union members
wholly initiated the strikes. However, the court affirmed the
district court's holding that the union's no-strike agreement nec-
essarily implied an obligation to use every reasonable means to
bring an end to the strike (begun by the union membership
without authorization from the local or international body). 60
The court stated that no-strike agreements would be illusory if
a union was permitted to avoid all responsibility for a strike by
5 534 F.2d 1063, 1074 (3d Cir. 1976).
56 Id.
57 520 F.2d 951.
' Id. at 955.
I d. at 956.
60 Id. at 959.
[VOL. 5:357
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the union membership merely because the strike was not initially
authorized or called by the union entity.
6'
In contrast to Eazor Express is the Fourth Circuit's decision
in United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co.,62 where
the court declined to adopt a reasonable efforts test. Instead,
the court applied agency principles in limiting the )local and
international union's liability to situations where 'the union
adopted, encouraged, or prolonged the continuation of the un-
lawful strike. 63 An explanation for the conflict among circuits
may lie in the factual differences of the two cases. In Eazor
Express, local union officials encouraged the strike, 64 while local
union officials in Haislip did not authorize or sanction the acts
of the membership 65 but actively encouraged the strikers to re-
turn to work. 66
As noted earlier, one year after its decision in Eazor Express,
the Third Circuit stated that the holding was not intended to
place absolute liability on union entities irrespective of the strength
of union officer's efforts to dissuade the membership from
engaging in illegal conduct. 67 In further extending the all reason-
able means theory, the Fifth Circuit in U.S. Steel Corp. v.
UMWA6 stated that local union liability for an illegal strike
may be avoided by a credible demonstration of union disap-
proval.
II. THE TURNING POINT: CARBON FUEL Co. v. UMWA
The conflict between the Third and Fourth Circuits continued
until 1979 and the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel Co.
v. UMWA. 69 The case involved an action under Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)70 against three
local unions, the district, and the international union. The com-
plaint sought injunctive relief and damages incident to forty-
eight work stoppages occurring from 1969 through 1973 at var-
61 Id. at 960.
62 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
63 Id. at 877-78.
" Eazor Express, 520 F.2d at 956.
65 Haislip, 223 F.2d at 878.
" Id. at 875.
67 U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 534 F.2d at 1074.
- 598 F.2d 363, 365.
69 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
70 LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
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ious mines operated by Carbon Fuel in southern West Virginia.
Upon trial in the district court, jury verdicts were returned
against the district, the international, and all three locals. 71 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated all damages assessed against
the international and district unions but affirmed most of the
judgments against the local unions.
7 2
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's determina-
tion of local union liability on the basis of the mass action
theory. Evidence indicated that all members of the defendant
locals, including the officers, participated in the strike. 73 Refus-
ing to extend the theory beyond the local union level, the Fourth
Circuit adopted the rationale of earlier cases that limited liability
to "the entity whose membership acts in concert."
74
Reviewing the damage awards against the district and inter-
national unions, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's
application of the all reasonable means theory. The court cited
the bargaining history between the union and the coal operator
in holding that the bargaining agreement did not impose "best
effort" duties on the international entity to prevent work stop-
pages. The Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the Third Circuit's
application of the reasonable efforts test in Eazor Express and
reaffirmed its own decision in Haislip. The court opted to apply
the agency theory of liability in deciding district and interna-
tional union liability for the illegal strikes.
75
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict between the Third and Fourth Circuits. 76 The
Supreme Court noted that "Congress gave careful attention to
the problem of strikes during the term of collective bargaining
agreements, but stopped short of imposing liability upon a union
for strikes not authorized, participated in, or ratified by it."
77
Relying on the legislative history of the LMRA, the Court held
that Congress intended to limit the unions' responsibility for
strikes in breach of contract cases to situations in which the
union may be liable under common law rules of agency.78 The
7 Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1347-48 (4th Cir. 1978).
71 Id. at 1349-51.
73 Id. at 1349-50.
74 Id. at 1349 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 534 F.2d 1063).
71 Carbon Fuel 1, 582 F.2d at 1350-51.
76 Carbon Fuel 11, 444 U.S. at 212.




Court noted that Congress, in drafting the LMRA, followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Coronado Coal Co. v. UMWA. 79
As discussed earlier, the Court in Coronado Coal held that union
liability depended on a showing that union agents had acted in
accordance with a fundamental agreement of association with
the union.
80
Reviewing the charges of liability against the international
and district unions, the Supreme Court expressly rejected Carbon
Fuel's argument. Carbon Fuel maintained that since the parties
had agreed to arbitrate their grievances, an obligation was im-
posed on the district and international unions to use all reason-
able means to prevent and terminate any unauthorized strikes.
The Court cited Congress' clear intent to restrict an international
union's legal responsibility for the acts of its local unions and
stated that applying the all reasonable means test "would pierce
the shield that Congress took such care to construct.""' The
Supreme Court adopted the Fourth Circuit's position in Haislip
stating that in the absence of a reasonable means clause, one
could not be implied in an instance of arms length bargaining
between the parties.
8 2
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE LIABILITY THEORIES AFTER
CARBON FUEL
The result of the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel
overwhelmingly validates the agency theory of union liability.
However, the decision cripples the all reasonable means theory
as a separate theory of union liability. Although the Court did
not specifically address the validity of the mass action theory,
the decision has led to inconsistent applications of the theory in
recent years.
Cases decided in the years after Carbon Fuel have differed
on which of the three liability theories remain valid in light of
the Supreme Court's decision. Apparently, a number of district
and circuit courts accept the agency theory as a separate theory
of union liability. The primary conflict has been whether and to
79 Id. at 217; 268 U.S. 295 (1925). See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
10 Coronado Coal, 268 U.S. at 304.
11 Carbon Fuel II, 444 U.S. at 217-18.
82 Id. at 221-22.
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what extent the mass action theory and the all reasonable means
theory survived the Carbon Fuel decision.83
A. All Reasonable Means Theory
Use of the all reasonable means theory as a separate theory
of liability did not survive the Carbon Fuel decisionA8 In recent
cases, courts have considered the lack of effort by local union
officials in returning strikers to work as evidence of the union's
ratification and encouragement of the strike, thereby establishing
the agency relationship.85 Other courts have found evidence of
whether union officials attempted to lead the union members
back to work, whether union officals worked during the strike,
and disciplinary action against strikers important in considering
agency liability. 86 "Whether action or lack of action by the union
is indicative of an agency liability is a question for the jury." '"8
B. Mass Action Theory
1. The Fourth Circuit Decision
Acceptance of the mass action theory has varied since the
Carbon Fuel decision. Nearly four years after the decision, the
Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its acceptance of the theory in Con-
solidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, UMWA. 88 The court again
noted the theory's limited applicability: extending only to "the
entity whose membership acts in concert.' '89
In Local 1702, the lower court held that the applicability of
the rule announced in Carbon Fuel did not depend upon the
11 Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1702, 709 F.2d 882, 885
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding mass action theory applicable at the local level) with Consoli-
dation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1261, 725 F.2d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that neither the all reasonable means theory nor the mass action theory survived Carbon
Fuel 11) and Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 2216, 779 F.2d 1274, 1278 (7th
Cir. 1985) (holding that only the common law theory of agency is the more desirable
standard for liability remaining).
", Local 1261, 725 F.2d at 1261.
15 Local 1702, 709 F.2d at 885-86.
", Local 2216, 779 F.2d at 1280.
17 Old Ben Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local Union No. 1487, 601 F. Supp. 1061, 1065
(S.D. 111. 1984).
" 709 F.2d 882.




level of union hierarchy involved and therefore, the mass action
theory was no longer a viable theory of liability at any level of
union organization.9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit refused to
accept this argument in light of explicit language in the Carbon
Fuel decision 91 restricting the scope of the decision to issues
involving the international union. In Carbon Fuel, the Supreme
Court did not review the portion of the lower court's opinion
dealing with the application of the mass action theory to local
unions .92
Along with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Local 1702, three
district courts have found the mass action theory still viable for
application at the local union level. 93 One of these courts has
held that the mass action theory no longer applies at any level
of union organization.94 The Eleventh Circuit in North River
Energy Corp. v. UMWA 95 acknowledged the principles of the
mass action theory but found that the particular facts of the
case did not warrant application of the theory. Subsequent de-
cisions in the Seventh96 and Tenth 97 Circuits have explicitly re-
nounced the mass action theory although the Fourth Circuit
recently reaffirmed its acceptance of the theory.9 8
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
One year after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Local 1702,
the Tenth Circuit ruled that neither the mass action theory nor
o Id. at 884.
" Carbon Fuel II, 444 U.S. at 213. The court noted:
The question for decision in this case is whether an international union,
which neither instigates, supports, ratifies, nor encourages "wildcat" strikes
engaged in by local unions in violation of a collective-bargaining agreement,
may be held liable in damages to an affected employer if the union did
not use all reasonable means available to it to prevent the strikes or bring
about their termination.
Id.
9, Local 1702, 709 F.2d at 884-85.
9, Id. at 885, n.4 (citing Dresser Indus. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local
4601, No. 81-627E (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Encino Shirt Co. v. International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, No. 73-W-5093-NE (N.D. Ala. 1980); Keebler Co. v. Local 492-A,
Bakery Workers Int'l Union, No. 80-1798 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
Local 1702, 709 F.2d at 885, n.4 (citing Airco Speer Carbon Graphite v. Local
502, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers of America, 494 F.Supp. 872 (W.D. Pa. 1980)).
95 664 F.2d 1184, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 1981).
96 Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 2216, 779 F.2d 1274.
" Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1261, 725 F.2d 1258.
" Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local Union No. 2322,
826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987) (text in WESTLAW).
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the all reasonable means theory survived the Supreme Court's
decision in Carbon Fuel.9 The Tenth Circuit further held that
the applicability of the Carbon Fuel decision did not depend on
the level of union hierarchy involved.' °° The court focused on
language in the decision where the Supreme Court stated "Con-
gress limited the responsibility of unions for strikes in breach of
contract to cases when the union may be found responsible
according to the common-law rule of agency."'' ° The court
stated that common law agency principles should be applied in
considering union liability for illegal acts by the union member-
ship, no matter what the level of union hierarchy. 0 2
One possible alternative explanation of the Tenth Circuit's
rejection of the mass action theory involves the undisputed evi-
dence that the local union officers lost control of the local
membership. 03 This factual situation parallels that contemplated
by the district court in United States v. International Union,
UMWA'0 where the court held that the union entity would not
be liable if the union can show by legitimate testimony that they
have lost their hold on the union membership.105
3. The Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit rejected the mass action theory as a
separate theory of liability in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local
2216, UMWA.' 0° The court cited the Carbon Fuel case as a basis
for its holding,'07 but further held the mass action theory invalid
on other grounds. The court stated that the burden of proof in
cases involving questions of union liability should be placed on
the accusing party rather than on the union itself. The court
noted that under the mass action theory, an accusing company
need only make the accusation that a strike occurred, and the
union must then try to exonerate itself. 0 8
Local 1261, 725 F.2d at 1261.
100 Id. at 1262.
10, Id. at 1262-63 (quoting Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 216) (em-
phasis added).
02 Id. at 1263.
103 Id. at 1260.
00 77 F.Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948).
Id. at 567.
106 779 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1278-79.
0 Id. at 1277.
[VOL. 5:357
UNION LIABILITY
The Seventh Circuit's decision is noteworthy because of the
court's unique treatment of the existence of mass action. Spe-
cifically, the court stated that evidence of mass action is relevant
and can be used in establishing common law agency liability.' °9
Here, the Seventh Circuit implicitly followed the decision in Old
Ben Coal Co. v. Local Union No. 1487, UMWA" 0 where the
district court held the mass action theory no longer viable as a
separate theory of liability. However, the district court concluded
that evidence of mass action is relevant to the question of agency
liability. The district court reasoned that the application of the
mass action theory through the years had actually served as a
legal device by which the agency theory of liability was proven.
This idea operates under the basic premise that the mass action
could not have occurred absent ratification or authorization by
union officials."'
The Fifth Circuit in U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMWA" 2 first
mentioned using evidence of mass action to prove union liability
under the agency theory. In this case, the court held that a series
of strikes amounting to a pattern of activity at the local and
district levels may give rise to an inference of union support or
ratification of the strike." 3 More recently, the Fourth Circuit
has held that the union entity could be liable for unauthorized
work stoppages under common law agency principles if the union
in some way made itself a party to the strike. The court con-
cluded that mass action by the union members and officers was
sufficient to establish the entity's liability under agency princi-
ples."1
4
IV.THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REAFFIRMS THE MASS ACTION THEORY
The most recent decision construing the mass action theory
of liability is the Fourth Circuit's decision in Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Local Union No. 2322, UMWA." 5 The 1987 case involved
a dispute between the local union and the employer, Consoli-
dated Coal (CONSOL). CONSOL's firing of two union employ-
-' Id.
110 601 F.Supp. 1061 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
- Old Ben, 601 F.Supp. at 1064.
2 519 F.2d 1249.
U.S. Steel, 519 F.2d at 1256.
Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, Local 1702, 709 F.2d 882, 886.
826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987) (text in WESTLAW).
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ees resulted in a strike by the local union members." 6 Upon trial
in the district court, the jury returned a verdict for CONSOL.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the jury's verdict and the
trial court's application of the mass action theory.'1 7 In so doing,
the court reaffirmed its decision in Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Local 1702, UMWA"8n which recognized two theories under which
a local union may be held liable for an unlawful strike - the
common law agency theory and the mass action theory." 9
The union argued that the part of the court's decision in
Local 1702 addressing the mass action theory should be over-
ruled in light of decisions in the Tenth 20 and Seventh'2' Circuits
explicitly rejecting the mass action theory. However, without
distinguishing the Seventh and Tenth Circuit cases, the Fourth
Circuit cited its decision in Local 1702 as controlling and held
the local union liable for the illegal strike action. 22
Addressing the union's argument regarding the inapplicabil-
ity of the mass action theory due to a lack of participation by
the total union membership, the court stated that the theory
applies where all or substantially all of the union members
participate. The court reasoned that the strike's purpose of
shutting down the employer's production could be easily achieved
even if a handful of union members reported for work.2 3
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
LocAL 2322
In refusing to reject the mass action theory as a separate
and distinct theory of liability, the Fourth Circuit has breathed
life into a theory which has undoubtedly lost independent sig-
nificance since Carbon Fuel. 24 However, since the court in Local
2322 did not elaborate on its application of the mass action
theory, the holding is open to some interpretation.
116 Id.
17 Id.
"1 709 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1983).
9 Local 1702, 709 F2d at 884.
11 Local 1261, 725 F.2d at 1258.
121 Local 2216, 779 F.2d at 1274.
In Local 2322, 826 F.2d at 1059 (text in WESTLAW).
123 Id.
114 See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Local Union No. 1487, UMWA, 601 F.Supp. 1061;
California Trucking Assoc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 679 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir.
1982); Local 1261, 725 F.2d at 1258; Local 2216, 779 F.2d at 1274.
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On its face, the decision can be read strictly as following the
rationale of Local 1702 and finding the union liable because of
the mass action of its members. Alternatively, the court may
have used the mass action theory to establish liability under
agency principles. The court had previously held that where all
members and officials of the local union were involved in an
illegal strike, their involvement was evidence that the union had
made itself a party to the strike thereby establishing liability
under the agency theory. 25 In Local 2322, evidence indicated
that all but one of the union officers refused to work during the
strike. 126 This explanation is consistent with the holding in Local
1702 and the holdings by the Seventh 27 and Tenth 28 Circuits.
Another issue in considering the implications of the decision
in Local 2322 concerns the opinion and the fact it was not
designated for publication by the court. 129 Several federal appeals
courts expressly provide that unpublished opinions cannot serve
as precedent. The rules of other courts merely imply that such
opinions have no precedential authority. 130
The Fourth Circuit disfavors but allows citation of unpub-
lished opinions. On occasion, the Fourth Circuit has even al-
lowed citation of unpublished opinions as precedent.' Namely,
the Fourth Circuit allows citation of unpublished opinions for
res judicata, law of the case, and collateral estoppel purposes. 3 2
Although one may cite unpublished decisions in the Fourth
Circuit, varying rules in other circuits make it unclear whether
unpublished Fourth Circuit decisions will be recognized in other
circuits.
CONCLUSION
Although modern courts widely accept the agency theory of
liability, the validity of the mass action and all reasonable means
Local 1702, 709 F.2d at 886.
'2 Local 2322, 826 F.2d at 1059 (text in WESTLAW).
,27 Local 2216, 779 F.2d at 1274.
" Local 1261, 725 F.2d at 1258.
' All federal circuit courts of appeals have issued rules which allow either non-
publication of certain written opinions or dispositions without opinions. Weaver, The
Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 478
(1988).
130 Id. at 479.
" Id. at 486, n.88.
12 Id. at 482, n.35.
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theories as separate and distinct theories of liability is in ques-
tion. Other than for use in establishing liability under agency
principles, the all reasonable means theory appears to be extinct.
However, as evidenced by the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Local
2322, the mass action theory remains a viable theory of local
union liability in some jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions recognize
the mass action theory, but only to the extent of using evidence
of mass action of the union members in establishing union
liability under common law agency principles. All jurisdictions
generally agree that the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon
Fuel renders the mass action theory inappropriate for application
on the district or international union levels.
Glenn C. Van Bever
